This paper addresses compensation of a group of individuals of particular interest to the target audience -accounting faculty. We observe that salary increases with publications, with the magnitude of those increases related to journal quality, i.e., the payment for a top tier publication exceeds that of a second tier publication, etc. For example we estimate the increase in annual salary for a top tier publication to be close to $4,000, with the increase varying across ranks -from about $2,500 for a full professor, to over $9,000 for an assistant. Given that these are annual increases in base salary, under reasonable assumptions for longevity and discount rate, the present value of a top tier publication easily tops $100,000 for an assistant professor! In addition we find salary increases with the prestige of the school at which the individual is employed, the individual's rank, and the cost of living of the city in which the employing school is located. We also find salary increases with prestige of the school from which the individual received his/her degree, although the premium dissipates over time. Not surprisingly we find a reward to mobility/penalty to loyalty. That is, we observe a statistically significant negative association between accounting faculty salary and the number of years the faculty member has been with his/her current employer.
Introduction and Motivation
In this paper we investigate an issue near and dear to readers of this journal, salaries of accounting faculty. That is, in contrast to the extensive literature discussing, debating and explaining CEO compensation 1 or even the literature on academic compensation in other 4 increasing with the quality of the journal. Overall we estimate a tier 1 accounting publication increases annual salary by $3,935, tier 1 non-accounting publication increases annual salary by $3,284, a tier 2 accounting publication increases annual salary by $2,195, and a tier 3 publication increases salary by $274. In additional analysis we observe that these increases vary by rank, with the increase associated with a top tier accounting publication for a full professor being $2,590, while the corresponding increase for an assistant professor is $9,236.
Considering that these are annual increases in base salary, under reasonable assumptions about longevity and discount rates, the present value of a top tier publication to an assistant professor easily exceeds $100,000!
We also observe, after controlling for quantity and quality of publications, that faculty employed at and those who graduated from more prestigious schools, and those of higher rank earn more. Not surprisingly we observe that mobility is rewarded and that loyalty does not pay, as after controlling for other factors we find that salary is lower the longer the faculty member has been with his/her current institution.
This paper continues with section 2 which develops our hypotheses. Section 3 then explains how we selected our sample, while section 4 provides our empirical analysis. We provide our conclusions, and recommendations to fellow accounting faculty, in section 5.
Hypothesis development
Much of the "compensation literature" either suggests that employees should be paid for performance or decries the lack thereof (Bebchuk and Fried 2004) . But how do we measure performance in an academic setting? The literature that most academics are familiar with is that pertaining to executive compensation, in which case performance can be measured by readily available accounting and market return measures. However the idea that individuals should be paid based upon their performance is not limited to the executive suite, 5 with researchers examining pay for performance and its impact in fields as varied as professional sports (Bloom 1999) and medicine (Rosenthal et al. 2005) .
Academics traditionally perform along three dimensions, research, teaching and service. Unfortunately it is more difficult to observe and objectively measure teaching and service than it is to observe and measure research. 4 Swidler and Goldreyer (1998) examine 311 finance professors at public research universities with the explicit goal of estimating the value of a top journal article, which they estimate to be worth, in present value terms, "between $19, 493 and $33,754". Mittal et al. (2008) examine 298 marketing faculty at 33 research-oriented public universities also documenting the reward to publishing. Only Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) who survey 353 professors of management incorporate teaching into their compensation model. However they conclude "that the primary determinants of faculty pay … are the number of top-tier journal publications a faculty member has authored and changes in institutional affiliation. Teaching performance and numbers of citations, second-tier publications, and books published affect pay allocations only for faculty members who have exceptional research records."
In contrast to Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) we, like Swidler and Goldreyer (1998) and Mittal et al. (2008) rely on publicly available data. Consequently our focus is on what we can observe externally, research productivity at public institutions that are required to disclose salary information. 5 Following prior research we expect that salary increases with the number of publications and that the increase varies with the quality of the publication outlet. 4 We are able to obtain teaching ratings from RateMyProfessors.com. However because we are only able to obtain ratings on 606 of our 949 subjects we incorporate this variable in our sensitivity rather than our primary analysis. 5 To the extent our sample is composed of public institutions our results are not generalizable to private universities.
6
H1: Salary increases with the number and quality of publications.
Graduates from a prestigious school are likely to be in higher demand -perhaps because they are expected to do more and better research -which should be reflected in initial salary. However a degree from a prestigious university will not suffice for tenure and promotions (as well as new job offers) without publishing. So over time pedigree likely fades in importance relative to research output. Our empirical question is twofold -do graduates of highly ranked doctoral programs receive higher pay, and if they do, does the premium dissipate over time? Or alternatively does it exist at all after controlling for research output.
H2a: Graduates from highly ranked doctoral programs command a salary premium.
H2b: The salary premium commanded by graduates of highly ranked doctoral programs decreases over time.
A similar question may be posed about the current employer. Faculty working at prestigious schools may be of higher quality and consequently receive a higher level of pay.
This quality should be reflected in research output over time, so the empirical question is whether there is an employer effect after controlling for research output.
H3
: Faculty employed at more prestigious institutions command a salary premium
Sample
Data on faculty salary are obtained from the following sources. 
Empirical Analysis

Research Design
The following variables, which are also summarized in expenditures on higher education, compensation structure (e.g., defined benefit versus defined contribution pension plans), and compensation reporting practices (e.g., 9 month salary versus entire amount earned over 12 months). All other variables are defined above.
Based on our hypotheses, we expect α 22 > α 24 > α 25 > 0. In other words, publications in higher (lower) quality journals will be priced more (less) in the market for accounting faculty. Following Mittal et al. (2008) we expect top publications in accounting journals to be more valuable for accounting faculty than top publications outside accounting, i.e., α 22 > α 23 .
If experience results in knowledge accumulation then α 27 > 0. However, if staying at the same school results in (salary) stagnation, α 26 < 0. Faculty at higher quality schools are expected to be better compensated, so we expect α 28 > 0 and if faculty with doctorates from better quality programs are compensated better, then α 29 > 0. However, if the pedigree effect wears off with time, we expect α 30 < 0. Since promotions typically result in statutory raises, we expect α 31 > 0. We also expect PhD granting institutions to pay more than institutions with only Masters programs, who in turn we expect to pay more than institutions with only Bachelors programs, that is, α 32 > 0. Finally, we expect that a higher cost of living will be associated with higher compensation α 33 > 0.
Faculty members graduating from the same PhD program or working at the same school may have similarities / commonalities, such as, preferred research paradigms, topics chosen for research, or journals picked for publications, etc. This may result in clustering effects. Clustered samples can lead to under-estimation of standard errors and over estimation of significance levels (Cameron et al. 2011) . We, therefore, estimate the tstatistics using robust standard errors corrected for school-level clustering and heteroskedasticity, consistent with Petersen (2009) and Gow et al. (2010) . Similarly we observe a large variation in average salary, with the highest being California ($198,988) and the lowest being Indiana ($96,244). While not tabulated we observe that the average number of publications varies across universities, with UCLA (7.44) and UNCChapel Hill (11.13) having the highest average publication rates in tier 1 accounting journals, whereas 33 schools have no publications in these journals.
Descriptive statistics
(insert Table 3 about here)
Panel A of Canadian faculty publish fewer articles on average than their US counterparts across most levels of quality (all with the exception of tier 3).
Panel C further partitions the US sample by type of school, i.e., Carnegie research versus non-research institution. As expected faculty in research institutions earn significantly more than faculty in non-research institutions, $149,372 versus $118,272. They also publish more in TIER1ACCT, TIER1OTHER, and TIER2ACCT, but less in TIER3ALL. Panel D partitions the US sample by faculty rank, where we see the average salary increases from $91,119 for an instructor to $212,655 for an endowed professor. Analogously publications also increase dramatically as we move from instructor to endowed professor -for example total publications increases on average from about 2 to 20! Full professors and endowed chairs are also more experienced and have spent more time at their current institution than 13 faculty at lower ranks. Instructors are more likely to be employed by higher ranked institutions (SCHOOLRANK). This may be because research institutions employ non-tenure track teaching faculty to compensate for lower teaching loads of research active faculty. coefficients on all the publication variables, i.e., TIER1ACCT, TIER1OTHER, TIER2ACCT, and TIER3ALL. We also note that the magnitude of the coefficient decreases with the quality of the publication, and that the coefficient on TIER1ACCT is significantly greater (p<0.05) than that on TIER2ACCT, which is turn is significantly greater (p<0.01) than that on TIER3ALL. So we find strong support for our first hypothesis. 18 Turning to hypotheses 2A and B, we find a positive coefficient on PEDIGREE, consistent with graduates of highly prestigious doctoral programs receiving a salary premium, although we find that premium decreases with time, i.e., the coefficient on the interaction between PEDIGREE and EXPERIENCE, is negative and significant. These findings support hypotheses 2A and B. Our final hypothesis predicts that faculty employed at more 14 prestigious institutions earn more. Employer prestige is measured using two variables here SCHOOLRANK and PROGLEVEL, where the former is based on the institutions' Carnegie classification and the latter is based upon the degrees offered by the institution. The correlation between the two variables is 87%. We include both as independent variables since they provide incremental information about salary. Since, their VIFs are not significant, multicollinearity is not an issue. We find the coefficients on both are positive and highly significant, supporting our third hypothesis that faculty salary increases with the prestige of the institution.
Regression Analysis
Turning to our other variables, we observe that compensation, as might be expected, increases with faculty rank, i.e., the coefficient on FACULTYTITLE is positive and statistically significant as well as economically significant -an increase in rank is associated with a $18,737 increase in compensation. We also observe that compensation increases with EXPERIENCE, at a rate of $571 per year since receiving highest level degree -inconsistent with the long held assertions of salary compression in academia (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin.
1987). However we do find evidence of a penalty to loyalty, as salary decreases (coefficient on CURRENTSTAY is negative and significant) by $605 per year that faculty member has been at his/her current institution. Finally we observe, as would be expected, institutions in higher cost of living areas pay more, i.e., the coefficient on COSTOFLIVING is positive and significant.
We next run regressions by partitions. Table 6 , replicates the analysis in table 5, after segmenting the sample into US versus Canadian institutions. For the most part, the signs and significance of the variables are comparable, so the focus of our discussion will be on the differences. For example, the payoffs to both TIER1ACCT and TIER2ACCT are higher for
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Canadian faculty. Similarly, the coefficients on EXPERIENCE and SCHOOLRANK are higher for Canadian faculty. In contrast the coefficients on FACULTYTITLE, PROGRAMLEVEL and COSTOFLIVING are higher for US faculty. Among the more important differences we find that non-research institutions reward lower quality publications, i.e., TIER3ALL, while research institutions do not. That the latter do not reward lower quality publications is not at first glance that surprising to those of us in the business. However, the descriptive statistics provided earlier show that even at research institutions the majority of publications are in what we categorize as lower quality journals, i.e., TIER3ALL. The question is why would they publish there? The answer may be that even though we cannot observe an incremental effect of lower quality publications on compensation, those lower level publications still help with promotion and tenure. And as noted in table 7, the coefficient on FACULTY TITLE in research institutions ($29,766 ) is significantly greater than that in non-research institutions ($22,634).
The prior analyses are likely misspecified in that publications affect FACULTYRANK, which is also an independent variable in the model. Table 8 controls for this by partitioning our US sample into four categories for assistant, associate, full and endowed professors. In the column for endowed chairs we omit the PEDIGREE and PEDIGREE*EXPERIENCE variables as all 44 of the individuals graduated from institutions classified by Carnegie as RU/VH (very high research activity).
Focusing on the coefficients of interest we see that publications in top tier accounting journals (TIER1ACCT) increase compensation at all levels, with the payoff greatest for assistant professors (the difference is statistically significant). A likely explanation for this finding is the diminishing marginal return to publishing. To test this possibility in untabulated results we rerun the regression incorporating the square of TIER1ACCT, TIER2ACCT, etc. While we continue to find a positive coefficient on TIER1ACCT, we find a negative coefficient on its square -consistent with diminishing marginal returns. We see a similar pattern for TIER2ACCT and TIER3ALL with one exception, endowed chairs are only rewarded for top tier accounting publications. That is the coefficients on TIER1OTHER, TIER2ACCT, and TIER3ALL while all positive, are insignificantly different from zero for endowed chairs. Surprisingly we only find a marginal payoff to publishing in other top journals (TIER1OTHER) , and only then for assistant professors. This is likely due to a lack of power, as the number of TIER1OTHER publications is a small fraction of publications in any of the partitions. For example, panel D of table 4 shows the average endowed professor has 5.66 publications in TIER1ACCT journals but only 0.57 publications in TIER1OTHER journals.
We also observe that PEDIGREE is associated with statistically significant increases in compensation for assistant, associate, and full professors, and as above with the pooled data set, the coefficient on the interaction between PEDIGREE and EXPERIENCE is negative and significant. Finally turning to our proxies for the prestige of the employing institution we see that PROGRAMLEVEL is positively associated with compensation at all four levels, while SCHOOLRANK is positively associated with compensation for associate and full professors.
Overall, tables 5 through 8 provide strong support for our hypotheses that compensation depends on the quantity and quality of publications (H1); the university from which the individual graduated and time since graduation (H2a and H2b); and the prestige of the current employer (H3).
Additional Analysis
In Column C examines the impact of teaching performance using 606 faculty members for whom ratings were available on RateMyProfessor.com. One of the biases in the data, and one of the reasons we lose more than a third of our sample, is that postings to RateMyProfessor.com are voluntary. Consequently, only a small percentage of students ever post to RateMyProfessor.com and those that do, we expect, are disproportionately at the tail of the distribution, either very happy or very unhappy with the faculty. Another issue with
RateMyProfessor.com ratings is that they are associated with the perceived attractiveness and easiness of the instructor (see Felton et al. 2004 , Felton et al. 2008 ). So we acknowledge the data is biased. However it is the only publicly available source of teaching ratings and the ratings are consistently measured across universities. In this sensitivity analysis we observe a positive association between TEACHEVAL and compensation, after inclusion of all the variables in model 1.
Our analysis in columns D, E, and F digs deeper into the quality of the publications as well as the authors' contribution to those publications for a random subsample of 250 individuals for which we have collected the data. After controlling for the number of publications, and the quality of the journals those articles are in, column D finds an incremental effect to number of citations which is consistent with Hamermesh et al. (1982) .
In particular the coefficient on CITATIONS indicates that each additional citation is associated with a $105 increase in annual compensation. In column E we find that compensation increases the greater the percentage of the time the individual is the first author on the paper. This is somewhat anomalous, as while in some disciplines authors are listed in order of contribution, in the vast majority of accounting papers authors are listed alphabetically. Thus authors with last names starting with A are likely to be first author most of the time. To test if institutions are being irrational (in our opinion), we replace FIRSTAUTHOR with indicator variables for A, B, etc. (first letter of last name) and do not find a result. In column F we attempt to control for contribution by looking at the number of times the author is elevated in the byline, i.e., his/her name appears earlier than it would alphabetically; and the number of times the author is demoted in the byline, i.e., his/her name appears later than it would alphabetically. As noted, that happens relatively infrequently.
Here we find as we would expect, an increased reward when someone's name appears earlier than expected, although we find no penalties applied when the person appears later than expected.
In our last table, table 10 , we estimate the present value of the annuity (increase in salary) associated with the publication of a top tier accounting journal by faculty rank. In it,
we show the present value of the annuity, assuming longevity of ten, twenty or thirty years, and discount rates of three, four and five percent. As shown in table 8 the annual increase in salary associated with a top tier publication is significantly higher for an assistant than a full professor. Assuming that assistant professors are younger than full professors, the difference in longevity will only accentuate this difference. For example, using the most conservative discount rate five percent, and assuming a longevity of ten (thirty) additional years for a full (assistant) professor, the present value of a top tier publication is $141,987 for an assistant professor but only $20,001 for a full professor.
Conclusion
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In this paper we have examined the compensation of a very important group of individuals, accounting faculty. In it, we show that compensation is positively related to the quantity and quality of research output, as well as the reputation of the school from which the individual graduated and at which she/he is employed. Beyond that we show that compensation is positively related to faculty rank, experience and mobility, or in the case of the latter, inversely related to lack of mobility. That is, faculty compensation is inversely related to the length of time spent at his/her current institution. This penalty, if you would call it, to loyalty, may be a function of the faculty member's unwillingness to relocate or may proxy for an omitted variable that is correlated with the faculty member's market value.
In sensitivity analyses we further investigated these issues providing additional evidence that compensation is positively related to the quality of the faculty member's publications, e.g., citations, order of authorship; and perhaps more importantly, provided evidence that teaching quality (or at least popularity) is positively associated with compensation as well. Number of years faculty member has stayed on current job CANADA Indicator variable with value of 1 for faculty working in Canadian Schools; and 0 otherwise EXPERIENCE Number of years' since obtaining highest degree FACULTYTITLE Coded 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 for non-tenure track, assistant, associate, full, endowed chairs, respectively FIRSTAUTHOR Number of articles with faculty member listed as first author LOG(CURRENTSTAY) Natural logarithm of (1+CURRENTSTAY) LOG(EXPERIENCE) Natural logarithm of (1+EXPERIENCE) LOG(SALARY) Natural logarithm of (1+SALARY) LOG(TIER1OTHER) Natural logarithm of (1+TIER1OTHER) LOG(TIER1ACCT) Natural logarithm of (1+TIER1ACCT) LOG(TIER2ACCT) Natural logarithm of (1+TIER2ACCT) LOG(TIER3ALL) Natural logarithm of ( see table 2 for details) TIER1OTHER
Publications in tier 1 journals from areas other than accounting (see table 2 for details) TIER2ACCT
Number of peer reviewed publications in tier 2 accounting journals (see table 2 for details) TIER3ALL
Number of peer reviewed publications in journals not included in TIER1ACCT, TIER1OTHER, and TIER2ACCT (see table 2 for details) Frequency of publication is defined as the total publications by all faculty in the journal deflated by the total number of faculty (=949). To be included in the above list, the journal should be ranked in one of the six published journal ranking studies (see below); and have a minimum publication frequency, which we define as 95 articles -on average one for every ten faculty in our sample. Consequently, some journals ranked highly in one of the above Journal rankings (for example, #5 and #11 from column 1) are not included in the table since they did not have the minimum frequency of publication. † The sources listed are as follows: (1) 
